CIAO DATE: 02/2012
Volume: 1, Issue: 3
June 2010
Elevating Development Assistance
J. Brian Atwood
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the “elevation” of the development mission and an end to the old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new “mindset” to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome reflection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues.
Do Three Ds Make an F? The Limits of "Defense, Diplomacy, and Development" (PDF)
Ethan Kapstein
In Washington, clever turns of phrase can be easily confused with deep analysis. One such phrase that has entered the Beltway’s intellectual echo chamber is the “3Ds” of defense, diplomacy, and development. But despite the numerous speeches and policy papers written on this topic, a simple question has been left dangling: does anyone really know what the phrase means in terms of the formulation and execution of U.S. national security policy?
Weak States and Security Assistance (PDF)
Derek Reveron
Given the large number of U.S. forces deployed around the world and the casualties sus- tained in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easy to miss that the Services do much more than engage in combat. On any given day, military engineers dig wells in East Africa, medical personnel provide vaccinations in Latin America, and special operations forces (SOF) mentor militaries in Southeast Asia. Through these activities, the United States seeks to improve its international image, strengthen the state sovereignty system by training and equipping security forces, preempt localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect national security by addressing underlying conditions that inspire and sustain violent extremism.
Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions (PDF)
Barbara Bodine
To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of Yemen’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Decisions and commitments that the international community and Yemenis make this coming year, affirmed at the London Conference, and the sustainability of those commitments over the long term will determine whether the reports become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Updating the Commander's Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict (PDF)
Laurie Blank, Amos Guiora
Gone are the days of soldiers facing off across large battlefields, tanks shelling tanks, and fighter jets engaging in dogfights. Armed conflict now takes place everywhere—in cities, refugee camps, and other historically nonmilitary areas—and involves or impacts nearly everyone in the area. The law of armed conflict (LOAC)—codified in times of more traditional state-state conflicts—must now adapt to these new and infinitely more complicated conflicts, which we call new warfare. More important, we need to recategorize the ever-expanding variety of individuals who now participate in and are affected by hostilities, posing great challenges to the implementation of LOAC on the ground.
Getting the Next War Right: Beyond Population-centric Warfare (PDF)
Thomas Marks, Sebastian Gorka, Robert Sharp
As the famous Prussian general once warned, the first priority is to ascertain what type of conflict is to be fought. Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal writings laid the foundation of thinking for modern warfare defined around the needs of the nascent Westphalian nation-state. His prioritization, his “wonderful trinity,” and his recognition that war is but “politics by other means” have served both strategist and statesman well during the conventional wars of the post-Napoleonic age.
Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations (PDF)
William Gregor
On September 21, 2009, the Washington Post published an article entitled “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure.’”1 The basis for the piece was a leaked copy of General Stanley McChrystal’s “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” dated August 30, 2009. In asking for additional forces for Afghanistan, General McChrystal stated that his conclusions were supported by a rigorous multidisciplinary assessment by a team of civilian and military personnel and by his personal experience and core beliefs.2 A week before the Washington Postarticle appeared, Senators Lindsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman, and John McCain made a similar call for more forces in the Wall Street Journal. In an editorial labeled “Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan,” the senators argued that General McChrystal was an exceptional commander and that he, the new Ambassador, and a new deputy commander composed a team that could win the war.
War in Complex Environments: The Technological Dimension (PDF)
Martin van Creveld
Unlike Caesar’s Gaul, this article consists not of three parts but of five. The first explains how advancing military technology has contributed to military stalemate among the world’s most important states. The second deals with the progress of military technology from 1945 on. The third argues that, in the kind of “complex” wars that have been most common since that date, the technology in question has been largely useless. The fourth focuses on the type of technology that can be used and has proved useful in that kind of war, as well as some of the ways in which it should be used. Finally, the fifth part summarizes conclusions.
Mindanao: A Community-based Approach to Counterinsurgency (PDF)
William Stuebner, Richard Hirsch
Over the past several years, U.S. Government agencies have been revising their thinking on counterinsurgency and stability operations. Despite recent doctrine and guidance about better ways to end conflict and promote lasting peace, however, something has been missing from the dialogue: a successful model of reintegration and economic growth in an Islamic insurgency that has taken combatants off the battlefield permanently. One of the best places to look for such a case study of fighting and winning “smart” is in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
Lessons from USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan (PDF)
Bernard Carreau
In July 2009, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) facilitated a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to capture the experiences of USDA agricultural advisors deployed to ministries and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The discussions yielded numerous individual observations, insights, and potential lessons from the work of these advisors on PRTs in these countries. This article presents a broad overview of the challenges identified by the conference participants and highlights key recommendations generated as a result of suggestions and comments made at the workshop.
Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars By James R. Lee (PDF)
Melanne Civic
Climate change has reemerged in the mainstream of U.S. Government policy as a central issue and a national security concern. President Barack Obama, addressing an audience at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology in October 2009, identified climate change and fossil fuel dependence as a national security threat needing innovative, science-based solutions to “[prevent] the worst consequences of climate change.” President Obama asserted that “the naysayers, the folks who would pretend that this is not an issue . . . are being marginalized.”
War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars By Richard A. Haass (PDF)
T. X. Hammes
In his introduction to this new edition of War of Necessity, War of Choice, Richard Haass states that the “book’s core is a distinction with a difference. There are wars of necessity and wars of choice. Confusing the two runs the danger of ill-advised decisions to go to war.” He might have added “or to continue a war.”